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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario: Jerry, an outstanding graduate of
Superior University's business school, has worked for Moneytree &
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Cashdollar, a prestigious investment banking firm, for three years. In
that period, Jerry's hard work and keen instincts helped increase
Moneytree's revenues by several million dollars. In addition, Jerry re-
ceived two awards for landing important new clients. The firm's manag-
ing partners have discussed promoting Jerry to junior vice president, an
executive position typically reserved for qualified fifth year employees.
Jerry's supervisors and peers enthusiastically commend his dedication
and skill. Two weeks before the vote on his promotion, Jerry lured a
particularly valuable client away from a competing firm, thus all but
ensuring his ascent to junior vice president. The partners consider Jerry
the consummate candidate. Unbeknownst to the partners, Jerry is also
a homosexual.
One week prior to the vote, Moneytree's personnel director sat
down with Jerry to explain the potential changes in his benefits pack-
age. Jerry knew that some companies offer benefits to their employees'
same-sex partners and inquired whether Moneytree would do the same.
Visibly shocked, the director explained that the firm never had consid-
ered such an option. Jerry did not push the issue. After Jerry left his
office, however, the director immediately phoned a managing partner
and informed him of Jerry's inquiry. Both agreed that Jerry's homosex-
uality presented a problem. The partner called a board meeting, and
the board decided that promoting Jerry to an executive position would
be disadvantageous to the firm. The partners informed Jerry of their
decision, citing his "unacceptable lifestyle."1 Jerry argued that his sex-
ual orientation had nothing to do with his work and never had affected
his professional relationships. Despite Jerry's protests, the partners re-
fused to reconsider their position.
Certain that he has a valid employment discrimination claim, Jerry
seeks relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).
2
Title VII defines unlawful employment practices to include: (1) the fail-
ure or refusal to hire any individual; (2) the discharge of any individual;
or (3) the discrimination against any individual with respect to employ-
ment compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges because of the indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.3 Additionally, Title
VII prohibits the limitation, segregation, or classification of employees
or applicants based on these personal characteristics when this limita-
tion would deprive individuals of employment opportunities or other-
1. The speed and severity of Moneytree's response may seem unrealistic, but in fact, this
fictitious company's actions are less drastic than those taken by a Shell Oil Industry subsidiary,
which summarily fired a 19-year veteran manager upon discovering his homosexuality. See Bob
Cohn, Discrimination: The Limits of the Law, Newsweek 38 (Sept. 14, 1992).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1988 & Supp. 1991).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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wise adversely affect their status as employees.4 Because Moneytree
refused to promote him because of his homosexuality, Jerry styles his
claim as discrimination based on sex. Both the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC)5 and the federal district court deny the
validity of his claim, holding Title VII inapplicable to discrimination
against homosexuals. If Jerry had been a female, or a black male, and
Moneytree had based its blatant discrimination upon those characteris-
tics, Title VII clearly would provide Jerry with a remedy.' But Money-
tree declined to promote Jerry-supposedly the "consummate"
candidate-solely because of his sexual orientation, and federal law cur-
rently allows this blatant discrimination.
Although Title VII has helped to alleviate unfair discrimination
against women and racial minorities, the judiciary's reluctance to inter-
pret the statute to protect homosexuals has prevented Congress from
achieving its ultimate imperative: to "prevent the perpetuation of ste-
reotypes and a sense of degradation" in the workplace.7 Congress in-
tended Title VII to prevent the injuries that occur when individuals are
mistreated because they possess certain personal characteristics and to
encourage employers to make valid decisions based solely on an individ-
ual's qualifications for the job."
This Note will show that in order to fulfill the ultimate goals of
Title VII, Congress must amend the statute to protect homosexuals
from employment discrimination. Part II of this Note examines the leg-
islative history of the original statute and its subsequent amendments
to illustrate the congressional motives behind the passage of Title VII.
Part II also traces the judiciary's interpretation of Title VII's goals and
notes that no court has applied the statute to prohibit discrimination
based upon the sexual orientation of employees.
Using an equal protection analogy, Part III explores the character-
istics that Title VII protects and concludes that each protected charac-
teristic represents a suspect or quasi-suspect class for purposes of
constitutional analysis. Part III further argues that sexual orientation
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
5. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, created the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) to investigate claims of employment discrimination under Title
VII, as well as to negotiate such claims and to provide plaintiffs with notices to sue if negotiations
failed. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). The President appoints the five members of the EEOC with the
advice and consent of the Senate, and each member serves a five-year term. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
4(a). The chairman of the EEOC appoints officers, agents, attorneys, administrative law judges,
and other employees. EEOC procedural regulations are defined in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1-.93 (1992).
6. Title VII specifically addresses discrimination based on an employee's or applicant's sex in
terms of gender (male or female) or race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2). See notes 3 and 4 and
accompanying text.
7. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990).
8. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989).
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contains all of the elements necessary to form a suspect or quasi-sus-
pect classification and therefore deserves the same protection afforded
Title VII characteristics.
Part IV contends that Title VII protects private employees from
discrimination in a manner similar to the way that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause protects state9 and federal ° employees. Sexual orientation
bears the judicial hallmarks of suspect or quasi-suspect classifications;
therefore, it merits rigorous protection under the Constitution and
under Title VII. The courts have rejected sexual orientation as a sus-
pect classification, however, and have refused to expand the meaning of
"sex" under Title VII to include sexual orientation. This Note con-
cludes that Congress should amend Title VII explicitly to prohibit dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation in order to fulfill the statute's
mandate and thereby eliminate discrimination based on a trait that,
like race, skin color, religion, gender, or national origin, is not indicative
of an individual's capacity to perform a job.
II. CRAFTING THE Bow AND ARROW: THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF
TITLE VII
In passing Title VII, Congress hoped to remedy the unequal treat-
ment certain classes of individuals" suffered at the hands of employers
or ,fellow employees. Although Congress did not intend Title VII to
guarantee jobs to all citizens regardless of qualifications, it clearly re-
quired the "removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment" when such barriers represented invidious discrimination
based on impermissible classifications. 2 The statute currently considers
"impermissible" any classification based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.' 3 As originally proposed, however, the bill did not pro-
hibit discrimination based on sex.
9. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
10. U.S. Const., Amend. V.
11. The Act specifically targeted discrimination against blacks. At the time of passage, Title
VII represented the only law "aimed at the economic causes of black oppression." Note, Develop-
ments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1111 (1971). See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800
(1973) (stating that Title VII purported to "eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices
which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens").
12. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 800-01 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971)).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
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A. The Sex Amendment: A "Stroke of Misfired Political Tactics 14
Legislative history indicates that the authors of the original civil
rights bill never contemplated prohibiting discrimination based on an
individual's sex. 15 Rather, Representative Howard Smith of Virginia,
one of the bill's principal opponents, proposed the addition of sex in an
attempt to ensure its defeat. 6 Much to his dismay, the House passed
the amendment 7 and ultimately the entire Civil Rights Act. Despite its
ironic and inauspicious beginnings, Title VII's sex discrimination provi-
sion today provides countless women with equal employment
opportunities.'
The amendment's hasty introduction and passage leave little his-
tory from which to divine the intended boundaries of the concept of
"sex."' 9 Congressional debate on the amendment fills only eight pages
of the Congressional Record.20 Additionally, the House Committee on
the Judiciary and the House Committee on Education and Labor heard
no relevant testimony before considering the bill.21 The House enter-
tained no comparable amendments and received no special interest pe-
titions to add sex to the bill.2 Moreover, examining the statute's
language itself provides scant assistance-Section 2000e(k) of the Act
states only that the terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex"
14. Leo Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 Hastings L. J. 305, 312 (1968).
15. Records of the House committee hearings on Title VII, 110 Cong. Rec. 2567-84 (Feb. 8,
1964), lack any discussion regarding sex discrimination, presumably because Congress originally
sought only to address employment discrimination based on race and national origin. See I. Ben-
nett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1158, 1167 (1991).
16. 110 Cong. Rec. at 2577. In support of his amendment, Smith facetiously claimed that
every woman should have the right to a "husband of her own." Id. See also Kanowitz, 20 Hastings
L. J. at 310-11 (cited in note 14).
17. The amendment passed by a vote of 168 to 133. 110 Cong. Rec. at 2584.
18. The amendment's passage has been described variously as "an accidental result of politi-
cal maneuvering [rather] than ... a clear expression of congressional intent to bring equal job
opportunities to women," Robert Stevens Miller, Jr., Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 877, 884 (1967), and a "mischievous joke perpetrated on
the floor of the House.. . ." Sex and Nonsense, New Republic 10 (Sept. 4, 1965). Today, however,
courts acknowledge Title VIl's importance in eradicating sex discrimination. See, for example,
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (recognizing the congressional purpose of
outlawing all sex-based discrimination); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662
(9th Cir, 1977) (finding that the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Amendments clearly in-
tended to "remedy the economic deprivation of women as a class").
19. Ruling in favor of transsexual Karen Ulane in her discrimination suit against Eastern
Airlines, Judge Grady of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
pointed out that the sex amendment's legislative history is "hardly a gold mine of information."
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 822 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev'd, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th
Cir. 1984).
20. 110 Cong. Rec. at 2577-84 (cited in note 15).
21. Id. at 2582.
22. Id.
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include, but are not limited to, discrimination based on pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions.2 3
B. The Courts' Traditional Notion of Sex
Individuals seeking relief under Title VII have called on the courts
to interpret "sex" numerous times, but the judiciary has not strayed
from the traditional definition's safe harbor. Despite creative, logical ar-
guments advanced by plaintiffs, the courts prefer to rely on the dearth
of legislative history underlying the sex provision to support a plain
reading of the term.24 EEOC rulings denying Title VII's application to
homosexual discrimination claims 25 provide additional support, as does
Congress's repeated refusal to amend Title VII to include sexual orien-
tation.2 6 In addition, some courts contextually have inferred a tradi-
tional definition of sex from the relative immutability of the status-
based characteristics of race, color, national origin, and religion.27 Ac-
cording to the courts' narrow definition, the only kind of sex discrimi-
nation actionable under Title VII is that which would not have
occurred but for the victim's gender.
1. The Sexual Orientation Cases
Citing the current narrow definition of sex, courts continually con-
strue Title VII as inapplicable to homosexual plaintiffs' employment
discrimination claims. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals tackled one
of the first of these claims in Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Com-
pany.28 Liberty Mutual Insurance declined to accept Smith's applica-
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
24. See, for example, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984);
DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979); Holloway, 566 F.2d at
662.
25. See, for example, EEOC Dec. No. 76-75, Emp. Prac. (CCH) % 6495 (1976). The EEOC
defines sex as referring to "a person's gender, an immutable characteristic with which a person is
born." Id. at 4266. Homosexuality is, on the other hand, but a "condition ... relate[d] to a person's
sexual proclivities or practices, not to his or her gender." Id. See also EEOC Dec. No. 76-67, Emp.
Prac. (CCH) 6493 (1976).
26. See, for example, Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1981, Hearings on H.R. 1454 before
the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and La-
bor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1982); Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1979, Hearings on H.R. 1974
before the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Education
and Labor, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1980).
27. See, for example, Dillon v. Frank, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766, *12-13 (6th Cir.); DeCintio
v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1986). The DeCintio court ex-
plained: "The other categories afforded protection under Title VII refer to a person's status as a
member of a particular race, color, religion or nationality. "Sex" when read in this context, logi-
cally could only refer to membership in a class delineated by gender, rather than sexual activity
regardless of gender." 807 F.2d at 306.
28. 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
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tion for employment as a mail room clerk because the interviewer
considered him effeminate.2 9 Smith, a black male, filed a sex discrimi-
nation suit against Liberty Mutual, arguing that Title VII forbids em-
ployers from rejecting job candidates based on sexual preference or
affectations.3 0 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, gleaning from sparse legisla-
tive history Congress's singular intent to guarantee equal employment
opportunities for males and females through the sex provision.3 1 The
court found that Liberty Mutual rejected Smith based not upon his
male gender, but upon his stereotypically female affectations.2 The
court refused to extend Title VII's protections to this questionable situ-
ation without a stronger congressional mandate because providing
Smith relief would do nothing to further the cause of equal opportunity
for men and women per se.
33
One year later, in DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Company, Inc.,34 the Ninth Circuit cited Smith when it affirmed the
dismissal of a sex discrimination complaint. DeSantis, a homosexual
male, claimed that Pacific Telephone and Telegraph (PT&T) refused to
hire him because a supervisor considered him gay. 5 In addition, DeSan-
tis alleged that PT&T officials publicly stated that they would not hire
homosexuals.3 " Following its own precedent, 7 the court held that sex
discrimination as envisioned by Congress only encompassed gender-
29. Id. at 326.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 326-27.
32. Id. at 327. Today, the court might hold Title VII applicable to Smith's claim, provided it
was couched not in terms of sex discrimination based on sexual preference but in terms of sex
discrimination based on impermissible sexual stereotyping. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989) (permitting a plaintiff to introduce evidence showing that sex stereotyping played
a part in the defendant's refusal to admit the plaintiff to partnership in order to prove sex discrim-
ination). For a more detailed discussion of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, see notes 113-29 and
accompanying text.
33. Smith, 569 F.2d at 327 (quoting Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d
1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975)).
34. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
35. Id. at 328. Two other homosexual males joined DeSantis's complaint. One alleged that
constant on-the-job harassment forced him to quit after only three months in order to preserve his
health, and another employee quit after four years under similar circumstances. Id. In addition,
the latter's personnel file was marked "not eligible for rehire," and PT&T rejected his applications
for employment in 1974 and 1976. Id.
36. Id.
37. Two years before DeSantis, the Ninth Circuit rejected the sex discrimination claim of a
female employee undergoing a sex transformation. See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566
F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). The Holloway court's examination of legislative history unearthed no
congressional intent other than the intent to restrict sex to its traditional, gender-based meaning.
Id. at 662-63. Discrimination based on transsexuality did not fall, therefore, under the purview of
Title VII. Id. at 664. For further discussion of cases involving transsexual discrimination, see notes
65-102 and accompanying text.
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based discrimination; therefore, Title VII did not prohibit discrimina-
tion based on effeminacy or homosexuality.
3 8
A full decade passed before the courts of appeals again addressed
discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Eighth Circuit's short
opinion in Williamson v. A.G. Edwards and Sons 9 proved a predict-
able and less than satisfying reprise for homosexual employees, how-
ever. Relying on DeSantis, the Williamson court tersely stated that
Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals. 0
The Sixth Circuit did not have the opportunity to examine the is-
sue fully in Ruth v. Children's Medical Center,41 but supported the
traditional interpretation of other circuit courts. The defendant fired
Ruth, a homosexual pharmacist, for failing to check prescriptions pre-
pared by pharmacy technicians. Ruth alleged that the defendant dis-
criminated against him based on sex because females who failed to
check prescriptions were not fired.42 The district court magistrate
granted the defendant summary judgment to the extent that Ruth al-
leged discrimination based on his homosexuality. The magistrate noted
that Title VII used the term sex to "refer only to membership in a class
delineated by gender. '4 Although Ruth failed to challenge this part of
the holding, the circuit court gratuitously remarked that they would
have affirmed the magistrate's "correct statement of the law on this
issue. 44
Dillon v. Frank45 provided the Sixth Circuit with the opportunity
Ruth had denied it. Ernest Dillon had worked for the United States
Post Office for seven years, the first four without incident. During the
next three years, however, his co-workers, believing that he was gay,
verbally and physically abused him.46 Upon the advice of his psychia-
trist, Dillon finally resigned.47 He filed a formal complaint with the
EEOC, which it ultimately rejected on grounds that Title VII's prohibi-
tion of sex discrimination did not apply to sexual orientation.48 On ap-
38. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 329-30, 332.
39. 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989).
40. Id. at 70.
41. 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19062 (6th Cir.).
42. Id. at *1.
43. Id. at *15.
44. Id.
45. 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766 (6th Cir.).
46. Id. at *1-3. Dillon's difficulties began when a fellow employee started calling him a "fag"
and saying that "Dillon sucks dicks." Id. at *2. This verbal abuse continued for five months,
climaxing in a beating that severely injured Dillon. Id. Although the Post Office fired the assailant,
"[w]hat had begun as a one-man band expanded into a full orchestral assault of verbal abuse"
when other employees continued to harass Dillon. Id. at *2-3.
47. Id. at *3.
48. Id. at *3-4.
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peal, the federal district court also held Title VII inapplicable to
discrimination based on sexual preference or orientation.
49
Although the court affirmed the district court's holding, its opinion
carefully explored various angles on the sexual orientation issue. Dillon
did not allege specifically that his homosexuality entitled him to Title
VII protection;50  the court therefore spent little time examining
whether the statute proscribes discrimination against homosexuals per
se. Instead, the court simply invoked the reasoning of the Smith, De-
Santis, and Williamson holdings and hearkened back to its own dicta
in Ruth.51
The court spent considerably more time analyzing Dillon's pro-
posed analogy between his circumstances and those of individuals who
recovered under Title VII sexual harassment claims based on hostile
work environments.52 Dillon argued that Title VII clearly proscribes
hostile work environments resulting from sexual harassment (verbal
and otherwise); therefore, harassment based on his perceived sexual ori-
entation, rather than his gender, similarly should be proscribed.53 In
essence, Dillon reasoned that his co-workers harassed him for being ho-
mosexual precisely because he was a male, giving him a valid Title VII
claim. Although the court found Dillon's analogy appealing,5 5 it held
that Title VII recognizes hostile work environment claims only when
the harassment complained of is based on impermissible criteria. 56 The
court decided that Dillon's co-workers harassed him because they be-
lieved he was a homosexual, not because he was a male. The court
49. Id. at *4-5.
50. Id. at *12-13.
51. Id. See also notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
52. Dillon, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766 at *13-14. Dillon cited cases in which women, sub-
jected to demeaning and cruel verbal abuse, secured remedies under Title VII. See, for example,
Wall v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1084 (M.D.N.C. 1990); Bennett v. New York City
Dep't. of Corrections, 705 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Porta v. Rollins Envir. Serv. (NJ), Inc.,
654 F. Supp. 1275 (D.N.J. 1987), aft'd, 845 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1988). Dillon also pointed to cases in
which courts permitted plaintiffs subjected to homosexual advances to sue under Title VII. See, for
example, Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934 (N.D. Ill.); Joyner v.
AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984);
Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
53. Dillon, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766 at *14-15.
54. Id. at *15.
55. The court found the analogy appealing because of the cruel treatment Dillon suffered
and its similarity to the facts in cases involving heterosexual hostile environment claims. Id. at *18.
56. Id. at *20. The impermissible criteria contemplated by Title VII only include race, color,
sex as gender, religion, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). See notes 24-27 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the traditional, narrow interpretation of sex.
57. Dillon, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766 at *22. The court found only one case that squarely
addressed Dillon's type of argument. In Carreno v. Local Union No. 226, Int'l Brotherhood of
Elec. Workers, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13817 (D. Kan.), the plaintiff, who was living with another
man in a homosexual relationship, suffered verbal abuse from his co-workers. Id. at *3. He filed
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again looked to other circuit court decisions to support its finding that
Dillon had no hostile work environment claim under Title VII because
homosexuality is not an impermissible criterion upon which to
discriminate."
Dillon also advanced an argument separate from the hostile work
environment claim. He pointed out that the Supreme Court allowed sex
stereotyping evidence to prove sex discrimination in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins.5 9 Dillon proposed that he suffered discrimination based on
such stereotyping because his co-workers deemed him insufficiently
"macho." 60 The Sixth Circuit indicated, however, that the Price
Waterhouse holding meant only that Title VII prohibited stereotyping
based on impermissible criteria e.6 Applying this narrow interpretation,
the court held that the remarks made to Dillon bore no relationship to
his gender per se, and thus found no sex discrimination.2
Although the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Dillon's case
somewhat reluctantly,63 the message from the circuits is clear: Title VII
does not now, nor did it ever, protect individuals from arbitrary em-
ployment discrimination based upon their sexual orientation."
2. The Transsexual Cases
Several courts have addressed an issue closely related to the sexual
orientation question-does Title VII's sex discrimination proscription
apply to discrimination against transsexuals? Their unanimous answer,
like those of the courts examining sexual orientation claims, has been
no. In Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center,65 the District Court
for the Northern District of California considered a Title VII claim
brought by Charles Voyles, Jr., also known as Carol Voyles, who worked
suit under Title VII, claiming that the harassment had risen to the level of a hostile work environ-
ment. Id. at *4. In order to establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim, plaintiffs must
demonstrate their membership in a protected group. Id. at *6 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). The court held that Carreno had failed to plead a prima facie case
under Title VII because his co-workers discriminated against him based not on his gender, but on
his sexual orientation. Carreno, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13817 at *7, *9.
58. Dillon, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766 at *22.
59. Id. at *15. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), involved a woman who was
effectively denied partnership because she was not considered feminine enough. For a more de-
tailed examination of Price Waterhouse and sex stereotyping, see notes 113-29 and accompanying
text.
60. Dillon, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766 at *15.
61. Id. at *28.
62. Id. at *28-29.
63. The court explained that "[w]hile we sympathize with [Dillon's] plight, we are con-
strained to hold that he has not stated a cause of action under Title VII." Id. at *2 (emphasis
added).
64. See notes 28-62 and accompanying text.
65. 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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for the defendant as a hemodialysis technician.6 Shortly after Voyles, a
woman, notified the director of personnel that she intended to undergo
sexual reassignment surgery, the medical center discharged Voyles on
grounds that a sex change would adversely affect her patients and co-
workers.6 7 Voyles, like many sexual orientation plaintiffs, argued that
discrimination based on her transsexuality violated Title VII's sex dis-
crimination prohibition. 8 The court, like many of the sexual orienta-
tion courts, found no congressional intent to proscribe any conduct
other than that which would not have happened had the victim been a
member of the opposite sex. 9 The court claimed that it could find no
indication in the legislative history or case law interpreting Title VII
that Congress intended sex discrimination to encompass transsexual
discrimination "or any permutation or combination thereof."
70
In Powell v. Read's, Inc., 1 the District Court for the District of
Maryland dismissed the Title VII claim of a male who was living as a
woman in preparation for sex change surgery. 2 The defendant fired
Sharon Powell, also known as Michael Powell, legally a male, on her
first day as a waitress.7" The court emphasized that Title VII addresses
discrimination because of the "status of sex or because of sexual stere-
otyping, rather than on discrimination due to a change in sex."' 74 Rely-
ing on an EEOC ruling that denied transsexuals protection against
discrimination under existing law, the court stated that Title VII is not
"susceptible to an interpretation which would embrace transsexuals. 76
The Seventh,76 Eighth,77 and Ninth78 Circuits also have declined to
interpret Title VII's sex discrimination provision to include transsexual
discrimination claims. The circuit courts relied on the dearth of legisla-
tive history regarding the sex amendment and the rejection of liberaliz-
66. Id. at 456. A hemodialysis technician assists patients whose kidneys function improperly
(or do not function at all) during dialysis, when the patient's blood is passed through a hemodi-
alyzer and thereby cleansed of toxins. See Black's Medical Dictionary 315-16 (West, 35th ed.
1987); Stedman's Medical Dictionary 633 (Anderson Co., 5th ed. 1982).
67. Voyles, 403 F. Supp. at 456.
68. Id. at 457.
69. Id. In a footnote, the court noted that the economic deprivation specifically suffered by
women prompted the enactment of the sex discrimination provision. Id. at 457 n.1 (citing Baker v.
California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896 n.2 (9th Cir. 1974)).
70. Voyles, 403 F. Supp. at 457.
71. 436 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1977).
72. Id. at 370-71.
73. Id. at 370.
74. Id. at 371 (emphasis in original).
75. Id. The court acknowledged that EEOC rulings are not binding, but nevertheless cited
the ruling as additional support. Id.
76. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
77. Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
78. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
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ing amendments to conclude that Congress intended a traditional,
gender-based definition of sex. 9 Interestingly, although the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc80 mirrored the
unanimous holdings of the other circuits, it did not merely affirm the
lower court's decision. Rather, the court of appeals reversed the district
court's holding,81 which was favorable to the transsexual plaintiff, in or-
der to reconcile the outcome with prevailing precedent.
Eastern Airlines hired the plaintiff, then Kenneth Ulane, as a pilot
in 1968.82 Prior to his employment with Eastern, Ulane had served in
the United States Army for four years." With Eastern, Ulane
progressed from Second to First Officer and served as a flight instruc-
tor.8 4 In 1979, psychiatrists diagnosed Ulane as a transsexual.8 5 He be-
gan taking hormones and underwent sex reassignment surgery in
1980.86 Subsequent to the surgery, the state of Illinois issued Ulane a
revised birth certificate indicating that "Karen Frances Ulane" had
been born a female.87 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) also
certified Ulane88 for flight status as a female.8 9 Eastern knew nothing of
Ulane's transsexuality, until she attempted to return to work after her
79. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084-85; Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750; Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662-63.
80. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
81. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821 (1983), rev'd, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1984).
82. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082.
83. Id. While in the military, Ulane flew several combat missions in Vietnam, for which he
earned the Air Medal of Honor with eight clusters, the Vietnam Service Medal, and the Army
Commendation Medal for exceptionally meritorious service. D. Douglas Cotton, Note, Ulane v.
Eastern Airlines: Title VII and Transsexualism, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1037, 1037 n.3 (1986). An
honor graduate of the Army flight school, Ulane was honorably discharged in 1968. Id. at 1037.
84. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082-83. Eastern Airlines considers the position of flight instructor an
honor. Cotton, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1037 n.5. In fact, during his twelve years with Eastern, Ulane
flew over 8,000 air miles and received commendations for exceptional performance. Id. at 1037 nn.4
& 6. Ulane's fellow pilots also elected him several times to represent them in the pilots' union. Id.
at 1037.
85. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083. Prior to this diagnosis, Ulane had sought psychiatric and medi-
cal assistance in dealing with the fact that he had "felt like a female" since early childhood. Id. In
a footnote, the court defined transsexualism as a "condition that exists when a physiologically
normal person. .. experiences discomfort or discontent about nature's choice of his or her particu-
lar sex and prefers to be the other sex." Id. at 1083 n.3. The court further distinguished transsexu-
als from "homosexuals, who are sexually attracted to persons of the same sex, and transvestites,
who are generally male heterosexuals who cross-dress . . . for sexual arousal rather than social
comfort; both homosexuals and transvestites are content with the sex into which they were born."
Id.
86. Id. at 1083.
87. Id.
88. Ulane hereinafter is referred to with feminine pronouns.
89. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083. Ulane successfully completed a series of rigorous physical, psy-
chological, and psychiatric examinations in pursuit of her FAA First Class Medical Certificate.
Cotton, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1038 (cited in note 83).
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reassignment surgery.90 Upon her return, Ulane offered to undergo any
required examinations or retraining before reassuming flight duty. 1
Without attempting to examine or retrain Ulane, 2 Eastern fired her.93
Ulane timely filed a claim with the EEOC, which issued her a right
to sue notice.9' Ulane then brought a Title VII suit in federal district
court, alleging that Eastern had discriminated against her as a female
and as a transsexual. 5 The district court found for Ulane on both
counts.9  Unlike other courts that had considered the issue, the Ulane
court construed the lack of legislative history as leaving room for a lib-
eral rather than narrow interpretation of sex. 7 Rejecting a traditional,
gender-based interpretation of sex, Judge Grady remarked that the
question of sex was not straightforward and that a liberal approach to
sex was appropriate because doubt existed in the medical commmunity
about the gender of transsexuals.98 In his opinion, the term sex properly
applied to transsexuals, both in a literal and scientific sense; therefore,
he supported Ulane's claim of sex discrimination under Title VIIL9
The Seventh Circuit quickly reversed the district court's renegade
opinion, stating that Title VII provides no protection for transsexu-
90. Wlane, 742 F.2d at 1083.
91. Cotton, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1038 (cited in note 83).
92. Id.
93. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082. Eastern explained one of the reasons that it gave for Ulane's
discharge: "To the extent the operation and the counseling ... changed [Ms. Ulane] from male to
female, [she was] changed ... from the person Eastern has hired into a different person." Ulane,
581 F. Supp. at 832. Eastern also stated that it would not have hired Ulane "had it known [she]
contemplated or might in the future contemplate such an action." Id. The district court found the
last statement a "virtual admission of discrimination ... based on sex within the meaning of the
statute." Id.
94. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082.
95. Id.
96. Id.; Mane, 581 F. Supp. at 839.
97. Wane, 581 F. Supp. at 825. The district court stated that Title VII, as a remedial statute,
should be liberally construed. Id. at 824. Because "there is not a shadow of a doubt that Congress
never intended anything one way or the other on the question of whether the term, 'sex,' would
inclvide transsexuals," the court applied the term in what it believed the most reasonable way to
comport with Title VII's remedial purpose. Id. at 825.
98. Id. at 823. Judge 'Grady specifically stated: "Prior to my participation in this case, I
would have had no doubt that the question of sex was a very straightforward matter of whether
you are male or female. That there could be any doubt about that question simply never occurred
to me. I had never been exposed to the arguments or to the problem. After listening to the evi-
dence in this case, it is clear to me that there is no settled definition in the medical community as
to what we mean by sex." Id. The evidence to which Judge Grady referred raised unresolved ques-
tions of whether sex is primarily chromosomal or psychological, as reflected in an individual's "sex-
ual identity" and influenced by social and self-perception. Id. at 823-25. Judge Grady found the
latter more persuasive. Id. at 825.
99. Id. at 825.
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als. °° Although the court of appeals agreed that remedial statutes such
as Title VII should be construed liberally, it described its interpretive
duty as circumscribed by Congress's intent.1°1 The court again turned
to the legislative history and observed that the dearth of information on
the sex amendment and the circumstances of its introduction and pas-
sage indicated Congress's clear intent to address only a traditional no-
tion of sex.102 Absent an explicit congressional mandate, therefore, the
circuit courts that have addressed the transsexuality issue consistently
refuse to expand the concept of sex.
3. The Sex-Plus Cases
The courts often have addressed Title VII's application to discrimi-
nation against homosexuals or transsexuals but rarely have ruled on
other types of allegedly sex-based discrimination. Opinions in these few
cases, however, further bolster the courts' narrow, gender-based inter-
pretation of sex. In DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center,0 3
the Second Circuit considered male physical therapists' sex discrimina-
tion claims alleging that a female colleague had been hired at a higher
salary based on a recommendation by the program administrator, with
whom she was romantically involved. 04 In this case, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that discrimination on the basis of sex encompassed preferential
treatment because of sexual liaisons and sexual attractions. 05 The court
of appeals held such an overbroad definition "wholly unwarranted"'' 0
and interpreted the language and legislative history of Title VII to pro-
scribe only differentiations based on an individual's gender, rather than
his or her sexual affiliation. 07
100. The court explained that "[wihile we do not condone discrimination in any form, we are
constrained to hold that Title VII does not protect transsexuals." Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084. The
court felt constrained, no doubt, by the overwhelming weight of adverse precedent. See notes 24-64
and accompanying text.
101. Specifically, the court stated that there existed "reasonable bounds beyond which a
court cannot go without transgressing the prerogatives of Congress." Id. at 1086. The Court of
Appeals emphasized that unless otherwise defined, words used in statutes should be given their
ordinary, common meaning. In the court's view, to ignore that principle of statutory construction
would amount to judicial legislating. Id.
102. Id. at 1085. The court surmised that "[h]ad Congress intended more, surely the legisla-
tive history would have at least mentioned its intended broad coverage of homosexuals, transves-
tites, or transsexuals, and would no doubt have sparked an interesting debate." Id.
103. 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986).
104. Id. at 305.
105. Id. at 306.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 306-07. The court asserted that the plaintiffs suffered prejudice not because they
were male, but because the program administrator preferred to hire his girlfriend. Id. at 308. In
other words, because the plaintiffs would have been discriminated against whether they were male
or female, they did not raise a valid sex discrimination claim. Id.
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The District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana dealt with
a unique "sex-linked" discrimination claim in Cairo v. OH Material
Corporation."o Cairo alleged that he was fired because he refused to
allow his supervisor to date his wife. 10 9 Because the supervisor, a heter-
osexual male, presumably would not have cared to date a female em-
ployee's spouse, Cairo contended that he was discriminated against
because he was a male." 0 The district court rejected this inventive ar-
gument, however, because it found no causal connection between
Cairo's sex 1' and the alleged discrimination." 2
4. The Sex Stereotyping Case-Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in several sexual ori-
entation cases, it affirmatively answered the question bf whether Title
VII prohibits sex discrimination based on sex stereotyping. In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,"' the Court admitted sexually stereotypical
remarks as evidence of gender-motivated discriminatory action."
4
Ann Hopkins had worked for Price Waterhouse for five years when
partners in her office proposed her for partnership. 1 5 In support of her
candidacy, some partners praised Hopkins's skill in obtaining valuable
government contracts as well as her competence, productivity, and
character." 6 Other partners, however, negatively referred to Hopkins's
aggressive personality." 7 One partner described her as "macho," an-
other remarked that she "overcompensated for being a woman," and a
third recommended that she take "a course at charm school.""' In a
genuine attempt to help Hopkins improve her chances for partnership
after her candidacy had been placed on hold, one partner advised her to
"walk more femininely, . . . wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
108. 710 F. Supp. 1069 (M.D. La. 1989).
109. Id. at 1070.
110. Id.
111. The court adopted the now-familiar narrow definition of sex, concluding that it referred
only to "membership in a class delineated by gender." Id. at 1071.
112. Id.
113. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
114. Id. at 251.
115. Id. at 233. The Court noted that at the time of Hopkins's candidacy, 7 of 662 partners
in the firm were female. Id. Of the 88 individuals proposed for partnership, Hopkins was the only
woman. Id.
116. Id. at 233-34. Hopkins undoubtedly was qualified for partnership. Judge Gesell of the
federal district court specifically found that "[nlone of the other partnership candidates at Price
Waterhouse that year had a comparable record in terms of successfully securing major contracts
for the partnership." Id. at 234.
117. Id. at 234-35.
118. Id. at 235.
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wear jewelry." 119 When the partners refused to repropose Hopkins for
partnership the next year, she sued for sex discrimination under Title
VII.120
In support of her claim, Hopkins offered evidence that Price
Waterhouse relied in part on sex stereotyping to make its decision. 121 In
light of the evidence, Judge Gesell decided that Price Waterhouse had
discriminated against Hopkins on the basis of sex by acknowledging the
partners' sexually stereotyping comments.12 2 The Supreme Court cau-
tioned that although sexually stereotypical remarks do not prove auto-
matically that sex motivated an employment decision, such remarks
may constitute evidence that gender played a part in the determina-
tion. 23 Affirming the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, the Court pro-
hibited discrimination based on such stereotyping and held that
employers could not base evaluations or promotions on an employee's
failure to display sexually stereotypical traits.'24
Although Price Waterhouse clearly establishes that Title VII pros-
cribes reliance on gender-based sex stereotypes, homosexual plaintiffs
have not prevailed on stereotyping claims in the lower courts. 25 For
example, in Dillon v. Frank the plaintiff raised a stereotyping argument
that his co-workers abused him because they did not perceive him to be
"macho" enough.126 The Sixth Circuit rejected this contention, stating
that Dillon provided no evidence that his co-workers based their com-
119. Id.
120. Id. at 231-32.
121. Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist and Associate Professor of Psychology at Car-
negie-Mellon University, testified that sex stereotyping likely influenced the partners' decision-
making process. Id. at 235. According to Fiske, Hopkins's "uniqueness" and the subjective nature
of the partners' evaluations made it likely that the sex stereotyping produced the sharply critical
remarks. Id. at 236.
122. Judge Gesell noted that Price Waterhouse "consciously g[ave] credence and effect to
partners' comments that resulted from sex stereotyping." Id. at 237. Judge Gesell also concluded
that "[c]andidates were viewed favorably if partners believed they maintained their femin[in]ity
while becoming effective professional managers." Id. at 236 (brackets in original).
123. Id. at 251. For example, "[i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who
acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted
on the basis of gender." Id. at 250.
124. The court stated: "[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employ-
ees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for '[i]n
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereo-
types.'" Id. at 251 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
n.13 (1978)).
125. For example, the plaintiffs in both Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th
Cir. 1978), and DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979), suffered
harassment because they were considered effeminate. Under Price Waterhouse, these plaintiffs
presumably would have had a valid sex stereotyping argument; however, courts decided both cases
a decade before Price Waterhouse. See note 32 and accompanying text.
126. 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766 *15 (6th Cir.).
1548
1993] PROTECTING GAY VICTIMS 1549
ments on the belief that Dillon's homosexual practices were acceptable
in females but unacceptable in males.127 The court's myopic focus on
Dillon's homosexual practices rather than his homosexual status ig-
nored the fact that many individuals initially prejudge homosexuals be-
cause they perceive gay men as unmasculine and gay women as
unfeminine. 12 8 Presently, however, plaintiffs discriminated against on
the basis of their sexual orientation are unable to use Price
Waterhouse's otherwise valid sex stereotyping argument successfully.
2 9
III. SIGHTING THE TARGET: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MEMBERS OF
SUSPECT AND QUASI-SUSPECT CLASSES
A cursory examination of Title VII's provisions reveals that the
statute forbids arbitrary discrimination based on characteristics consid-
ered suspect or quasi-suspect for equal protection purposes. 30 The ra-
tionale behind the inclusion of such traits is easily
understood-characteristics such as race, religion, sex, and national ori-
gin typically have nothing to do with employment qualifications. More-
over, public actions based on such characteristics merit heightened
scrutiny under the Constitution; therefore, protection from similarly
motivated private actions under a civil rights statute seems a natural
corollary. In enacting Title VII, Congress provided private employees'
the protection that the Due Process 32 and Equal Protection' Clauses
always have provided for state and federal employees.
127. Id. at *27-28.
128. See Harris M. Miller II, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Height-
ened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 797, 821 n.150 (1984).
129. For an extensive discussion of sex stereotyping and a persuasive argument that courts
can extend Title VII protection to homosexuals simply by extending sex stereotyping analysis to
sexual orientation cases, see Capers, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1158-87 (cited in note 15).
130. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (finding racial classifications suspect and
subject to strict judicial scrutiny); Mississippi U. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982)
(finding gender classifications quasi-suspect and subject to heightened judicial scrutiny); Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (finding national origin classifications suspect
and subject to strict judicial scrutiny). Although the Court does not consider religion a suspect
class per se, it ranks as a fundamental right guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause of the Consti-
tution and thus merits strict scrutiny under equal protection analysis. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 406 (1963). See also U.S. Const., Amend. I. For descriptions of strict and heightened
scrutiny, see note 135. Classifications based on non-suspect characteristics, such as wealth, merit
rational basis scrutiny, which requires only that the classification be rationally related to a legiti-
mate governmental interest. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973).
131. Congress subsequently amended Title VII to bring state and federal executive branch
employees within its purview. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86
Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e).
132. U.S. Const., Amend. V; U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
133. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
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A. The Nature of Suspect or Quasi-Suspect Classes
In determining which classes merit suspect or quasi-suspect status,
the courts have relied on several criteria-whether the group histori-
cally has suffered discrimination, whether the group exhibits "obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a dis-
crete group," and whether the group is a minority or is politically pow-
erless.134 Once a class achieves suspect or quasi-suspect status, any
legislation that discriminates on the basis of membership in that class
automatically receives heightened judicial scrutiny.
3 5
The Supreme Court uses the Equal Protection Clause primarily as
an instrument for eliminating state-sponsored, invidious racial discrimi-
nation.136 To help achieve this worthwhile goal, the Court subjects stat-
utes based upon racial classifications to the highest level of judicial
scrutiny, strict scrutiny. 3 7 Satisfying this burden is difficult, because
strict scrutiny analysis, in effect, presumes that classifications based on
race are arbitrary and unrelated to any legitimate governmental pur-
pose.13 Accordingly, the government bears the burden of demonstrating
that the law is necessary to address a compelling interest and is nar-
rowly tailored to address that interest.
In Loving v. Virginia, s9 the Court applied strict scrutiny to strike
down an anti-miscegenation statute. 4 0 The statute prohibited mar-
riages between whites and "coloreds," punishing each party equally.""
The State argued that providing equal punishment for both whites and
blacks rendered the statute nondiscriminatory.'42 Rejecting this conten-
tion, the Court held that, regardless of "equal application," the stat-
134. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir.
1990) (citing. Bowen v. GiUiard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987)) (High Tech Gays /). If the court does
not find the group a minority or politically powerless, it will ask in the alternative whether the
classification burdens a fundamental right. Id.
135. Strict scrutiny demands that the legislation at issue address a compelling state interest
and seek to achieve that interest by narrowly tailored means. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97,
102 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Quasi-suspect classifications, such as those based upon gender or illegitimacy,
give rise to a heightened standard of scrutiny, which asks that the statute be "substantially related
to a legitimate state interest." Id. (quoting Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982)).
136. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 10.
137. Id. at 11. See also note 135.
138. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 10-11. See also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (noting that "all
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect....
Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antago-
nism never can.").
139. 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
140. Id. at 11. The statute prohibited marriage between "colored" persons and white persons,
prescribing up to five years in prison for the "felony" of interracial marriage. Id. at 4.
141. The statute provided that a white person who intermarried with a "colored" person
faced the same penalty as a "colored" person who intermarried with a white person. Id.
142. Id. at 8.
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ute's use of racial classifications to deny Virginia's citizens the right to
marry violates the very principle of the Equal Protection Clause.14 3
Often, only a blurry line exists between a classification based upon
race and one based upon national origin.' 4 For example, many courts
cite Korematsu v. United States 46 as support for the inherent suspect
nature of classifications based on national origin.146 The Court actually
framed the constitutional issue, however, in terms of race and ances-
try. 1 47 Despite the cloudy distinction, the Court saw fit to apply strict
scrutiny to a World War II military order that excluded all persons of
Japanese ancestry from a West Coast military area.14 Although the
Court ultimately upheld the order, 49 it recognized the suspect nature of
a classification based upon national origin.
The Equal Protection Clause also protects against sex discrimina-
tion, particularly involving women. In Frontiero v. Richardson,'50 the
Supreme Court declared classifications based upon sex inherently sus-
pect and therefore subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. 151 The Court
referenced a longstanding history of discrimination against women in
the educational, employment, and political arenas. 152 By affording sex
143. Id. at 12. The Court held that "equal application does not immunize [a] statute [con-
taining racial classifications] from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth
Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race." Id. at 9.
144. See, for example, Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection
Context: Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 Georgetown L. J. 89, 107 n.108 (1984).
Sherry suggests that the Court considers national origin the equivalent of race, ostensibly because
most examples of discrimination based upon national origin involve Asians (a racial group) or His-
panics (popularly perceived as a racial group). Id.
145. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
146. See, for example, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 n.9 (1973) (citing Kore-
matsu, among other cases, as support for the suspectness of classifications based on national
origin).
147. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223 (asserting that "Korematsu was not excluded from the
Military Area because of hostility to him or his race"); id. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (stating
that "it is the case of convicting a citizen . . . based on his ancestry, and solely because of his
ancestry"); id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (noting that "[s]uch exclusion ... falls into the ugly
abyss of racism").
148. Id. at 216.
149. In upholding the order, the Court deferred to the power of the military to protect the
United States during times of war. Id. at 223.
150. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
151. Frontiero, a female Air Force officer, sought increased benefits for her husband. The
relevant statutes provided that spouses of male officers automatically were considered dependents
for purposes of receiving increased benefits, but spouses of female officers could be considered
dependents only if they in fact were dependent upon their wives for more than one-half of their
support. Id. at 678-80. Frontiero's application was denied for failure to satisfy the statutory depen-
dency standard. Id. The Court found the statutes unconstitutional under strict scrutiny analysis
because they differentiated between male and female military officers solely for administrative
convenience. Id. at 690-91.
152. Id. at 684-86. The Court characterized this discrimination as "'romantic paternalism'
which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." Id. at 684. Discrimination
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suspect status, the Frontiero court paved the way for strict judicial
scrutiny of such arbitrary statutes.
The Court later announced, however, that gender-based classifica-
tions would be judged on a less strict standard of scrutiny because gen-
der was a quasi-suspect, rather than a suspect class. 153 The Court
subsequently applied this standard to strike down an Oklahoma statute
prohibiting the sale of beer to males under twenty-one and females
under eighteen, 54 but the quasi-suspect nature of gender classifications
consistently merits a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis.15 5 The
Court has distinguished classifications based on sex from non-suspect
classifications based on intelligence or physical disability, recognizing
that sex usually bears no relation to an individual's capacity to perform
or contribute to society.' Statutes that incorporate classifications
based on sex discriminate against males or females without contemplat-
ing their individual abilities, 57 thus involving the "very kind of arbi-
trary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution]."'' 5 8
Although religion is not a suspect classification per se, strict scru-
tiny also applies to statutes that burden the exercise of a fundamental
right. 59 The Free Exercise Clause specifically guarantees citizens the
right to religious beliefs free from governmental interference. 60 The
Fourteenth Amendment, incorporating the Free Exercise Clause, pro-
vides that no state shall deny individuals equal protection of the laws
solely because of their religious beliefs or practices.' 61 Classifications
based upon religion therefore merit strict judicial scrutiny.
against females resulted in "statute books ... laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between
the sexes," as well as relative political powerlessness for women. Id. at 685.
153. Mississippi U. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982).
154. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
155. Id. at 197. The heightened scrutiny applied in gender cases demands that the classifica-
tions serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to their achievement.
Id.
156. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
157. Id. at 686-87.
158. Id. at 690 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)) (brackets in original).
159. See, for example, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1962) (holding that when
unemployment benefit provisions had the effect of penalizing Sherbert for observing her Sabbath
Day, "no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice;"
rather, the statute must further a compelling state interest by narrowly tailored means).
160. U.S. Const., Amend. I. (stating: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ..
161. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV.
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B. Sexual Orientation as a Suspect or Quasi-Suspect Classification
Several courts have addressed claims that homosexuals possess all
of the criteria required of a suspect class,'162 but currently, not one has
accorded gays and lesbians such status. The Tenth Circuit recently re-
versed the one decision that held sexual orientation to be a suspect
classification, but left the inherent suspect status of homosexuality
unexamined by disposing of the case on different grounds."6" In Jantz v.
Muci,'" the District Court for the District of Kansas considered a civil
rights claim alleging an infringement of equal protection rights. 6 5
Vernon Jantz, a schoolteacher, claimed that the defendant, a public
school principal, denied him a teaching position based on his perception
that Jantz exhibited "homosexual tendencies."' 6 6 In evaluating Jantz's
equal protection claim, the court carefully analyzed the nature of sexual
orientation, concluding that sexual orientation is not a matter of choice
and that homosexuals suffer extreme discrimination because of their




162. See, for example, High Tech Gays 1, 895 F.2d at 563, reh'g denied, High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1990) (High Tech Gays I1)); Padula v.
Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991). In Wat-
kins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (Watkins 1), the Ninth Circuit held in part that
homosexuals constituted a suspect class for equal protection purposes. The opinion was with-
drawn, however, a year later. In Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (Watkins I1),
the court of appeals held that the defendant was estopped from barring the plaintiff's reenlistment
solely because of his acknowledged homosexuality. The Watkins II court did not reach the consti-
tutional issues raised in Watkins L Id. at 705. Nevertheless, the concurrence of Judge Norris, who
had written the Watkins I opinion, reemphasized, in nearly identical language, his original conclu-
sion that homosexuals constituted a suspect class. Id. at 711-31 (Norris, J., concurring).
163. Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992). The court held that the defendant, a
school principal, was entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiff's civil rights claim. Id. at
630.
164. 759 F. Supp. 1543 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992).
165. Id. at 1543. Jantz filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), a federal constitutional tort
statute.
166. Id. The defendant, school principal Cleofas Muci, claimed that he selected another can-
didate because he was more qualified than Jantz. Id. at 1545. Jantz challenged Muci's proposed
explanation, citing the testimony of Muci's secretary, who acknowledged that she made an offhand
comment to Muci that Jantz reminded her of her husband, whom she believed to be homosexual.
Id. Jantz also cited the school social studies coordinator, who testified that when he questioned
Muci about his decision not to hire Jantz, Muci replied that it was because of Jantz's "homosexual
tendencies." Id.
167. The court specifically stated:
Sexual orientation is not a matter of choice; it is a central and defining aspect of the personal-
ity of every individual. Homosexuals have been and remain the subject of invidious discrimi-
nation. No other identifiable minority group faces the dilemma dealt with every day by the
homosexual community-the combination of active and virulent prejudice with the lack of an
effective political voice .... Accordingly, the court finds that a governmental classification
based on an individual's sexual orientation is inherently suspect.
Id. at 1551.
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1. A History of Discrimination
The Jantz court pointed out that homosexuals 'have experienced
continuous and extremely intense discrimination.""8 Even courts that
have declined to extend suspect status to homosexuals agree that gays
and lesbians historically have been subjected to purposeful discrimina-
tion. 69 In fact, one court noted, "Lesbians and gays have been the ob-
ject of some of the deepest prejudice and hatred in American
society." 70 This discrimination exists not only in the public and private
employment context but is pervasive throughout every aspect of soci-
ety.' 1 Judges Canby and Norris of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
dissenting from the denial of a rehearing en banc in High Tech Gays
11, 172 insightfully pointed out that this history of intense and pervasive
discrimination makes it probable that any different treatment is simply
a product of past prejudice,'73 rather than a legitimate classification
necessary to achieve a pressing government goal. According to Judges
Canby and Norris, the judiciary should not endorse the discrimination
by refusing to subject classifications based on sexual orientation to
strict or heightened scrutiny.
1 4
Discrimination against homosexuals often is violent in nature, as
evidenced by nationwide instances of "gay bashing."' 75 Last year in
Portland, Maine, youths pursued a community development worker
with AIDS, throwing rocks and yelling, "Hey, faggot, we're going to get
you."'1 76 Gay advocates indicate that "[d]rive-by slurs and egg-tossings
have given way ... to nail-studded baseball bats and switchblades.
M 77
The federal government cannot claim ignorance of these violent forms
of homosexual discrimination. For example, in passing the Hate Crimes
Statistics Act of 1990 (HCSA), 75 it specifically directed the Depart-
168. Id. at 1549.
169. See, for example, High Tech Gays I, 895 F.2d at 573.
170. High Tech Gays I, 909 F.2d at 377 (quoting High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec.
Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).
171. Jantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1549.
172. High Tech Gays II, 909 F.2d at 376 (Canby, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 376-77.
174. Id.
175. Jantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1549. The Jantz court cited a study that found that homosexuals
are victimized more often than any other minority group. Id. The National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force Policy Institute estimates that anti-gay harassment and violence increased 31% in 1991 in
the cities of New York, San Francisco, Chicago, Boston, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. See Gays
Under Fire, Newsweek 34, 36 (Sept. 14, 1992).
176. Gays Under Fire, Newsweek at 35.
177. Id. at 36.
178. Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990). For further discussion of HCSA, see Peter M.
Cicchino, Bruce R. Deming, and Katherine M. Nicholson, Comment, Sex, Lies and Civil Rights: A




ment of Justice to collect and publish information about crimes mani-
festing prejudice against a victim's sexual orientation.1 79 The statute
also covers crimes that involve violence based on race, religion, or
ethnicity' 80-not coincidentally, characteristics nearly identical to those
protected by Title VII.181
Much of the discrimination based on sexual orientation stems from
incorrect stereotyping." 2 People often view homosexual males as effem-
inate and homosexual females as masculine; however, research indicates
that mannerisms alone do not indicate homosexuality.8 3 Contrary to
popular sentiment, homosexuals do not seek to "convert" the straight
population of America, nor are they more likely to molest children
than heterosexuals. 185 The National Association for Health, the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, and the Surgeon General agree that homo-
sexuality is not a mental illness, 86 yet many believe that homosexuals
are "sick." Although sexual orientation "implies no impairment in judg-
ment, stability, reliability or general social or vocational capabilities,"' 81
homosexuals continue to suffer unwarranted discrimination based on
these stereotypes. 8
2. An Immutable Characteristic
In declining to apply heightened scrutiny to legislation that dis-
criminates on the basis of sexual orientation, courts have declared that
homosexuality is not immutable and therefore cannot be suspect. 8 9
These courts maintain that sexual orientation is "fundamentally differ-
ent from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which define already
existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes,"' 190 because homosexuality is
primarily "behavioral" in character. The Jantz court pointed out that
179. HCSA, 104 Stat. at 140.
180. Id.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
182. For a general discussion of such stereotypes, see Miller, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 821-24
(cited in note 128).
183. Id. at 821 n.150.
184. Id. at 821-22.
185. Id. at 822-23. In fact, the opposite seems to be true. See id. at 823.
186. Id. at 823-24. As early as 1935, Sigmund Freud classified homosexuality as a "variation
of the sexual function," rather than as an illness. Id. at 824.
187. Jantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1548.
188. See notes 113-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of reliance on sex stereotyping
as valid evidence of sex discrimination under Title VII.
189. See High Tech Gays 1, 895 F.2d at 573; Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068,
1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 1991).
190. High Tech Gays 1, 895 F.2d at 573. The Ninth Circuit further stated that the "behavior
or conduct of such already recognized classes is irrelevant to their identification." Id. at 573-74.
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these findings are unsupported by legal, scientific, or medical
authority.19'
Many recent studies lend scientific credence to the claim that sex-
ual orientation is, for the most part, immutable. In 1990, Professor Dick
Swaab, Director of the Netherlands Institute for Brain Research in Am-
sterdam, and his colleagues found that in homosexual men the area of
the brain known as the suprachiasmatic nucleus possessed twice the
number of cells and was twice as large as in heterosexual men. 192 A year
later, Dr. Simon LeVay of the Salk Institute for Biological Studies in
San Diego found that an area located in the anterior hypothalamus
known as INAH-3 was half the size in homosexual men as in heterosex-
ual men. 93 More recently, two anatomists at the University of Califor-
nia at Los Angeles reported that the anterior commissure of the brain,
which connects the two hemispheres, was larger in homosexual men
than in heterosexual men.' Although the researchers admit that it is
unlikely that the structural differences could cause homosexuality, all
agree that the variations most likely result from the brain's response to
the sex hormones that influence early development.
195
In addition, other researchers have reported that genetics may in-
fluence sexual orientation. Psychology Professor Michael Bailey of
Northwestern University in Chicago studied the incidence of homosexu-
ality in related men. 96 Professor Bailey found that in fifty-two percent
of the pairs of identical twins, both were homosexual, as opposed to
twenty-two percent of the fraternal twins and only eleven percent of
the adoptive brothers.9 7 One neuroscientist who discovered that homo-
sexual men scored midway between men and women on tests of spatial
and verbal ability believes that "[i]t is as though, in a neurological
sense, homosexual men are a third sex."' 98 Even if biology is not one
hundred percent responsible for sexual orientation, most researchers
believe that sexual orientation most often is determined before pu-
191. Jantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1547.
192. Sharon Kingman, Nature, Not Nurture?, The Independent 56, 56 (Oct. 4, 1992). Scien-
tists believe that the suprachiasmatic nucleus is involved in regulating the biological clock. Id.
193. Id. INAH-3 is known to regulate sexual behavior in male monkeys. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 56-57.
196. Bailey studied 25 pairs of identical twins, each of whom share identical genes; fraternal
twins, who have similar genes; and adoptive brothers, who possess completely unrelated genes. Id.
Bailey conducted a similar study of lesbians and their sisters and discovered similar results. Id. at
57.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 56. Sandra Witelson, a neuroscientist at McMaster University in Hamilton, Onta-
rio, performed the tests along with Cheryl McCormick, a psychologist at McGill University in
Montreal. Id.
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berty99 and most likely is immutable. 00 This evidence strongly rebuts
the courts' belief that homosexuality is primarily behavioral in nature.
Moreover, it undermines the Steffan court's assumption that sexual ori-
entation is chosen, rather than preordained, and thus not an immutable
characteristic.
20 1
Evidence from these studies should convince the judiciary that sex-
ual orientation is relatively intractable, but according to the Jantz
court's interpretation of "immutability," such evidence may not even be
necessary. The Jantz court emphasized that "complete and absolute
immutability simply is not a prerequisite for suspect classification.
20 2
By way of example, the court explained that although race, gender, and
alienage might be mutable in some cases, discrimination on the basis of
such classes still compels heightened judicial scrutiny. 0 Although
traits such as race or sexual orientation may be altered or concealed,
such a change would be very difficult and perhaps costly, financially
and otherwise.04 Immutability more accurately might describe, there-
fore, central, defining traits that may be altered only at the "expense of
significant damage to the individual's sense of self. 2 0 5 Sexual orienta-
tion also is a central, defining identity trait; under the Jantz court's
199. See, for example, High Tech Gays II, 909 F.2d at 377 (Canby, J., dissenting) (stating
that "[s]exual identity is established at a very early age; it is not a matter of conscious or controlla-
ble choice").
200. See Shelley Page, The Biology of Being Gay, The Ottawa Citizen El (May 24, 1992). Dr.
Ken Zucker, head of the Child and Adolescent Gender Identity Clinic at the Clarke Institute of
Psychiatry in Toronto, believes that many professionals in the field have come to realize that, in
most cases, "you can't make a man prefer sex with a woman if that's not his true sexual orienta-
tion." Id. The Alfred C. Kinsey Institute for Sex Research concluded from empirical studies:
"[Hiomosexuality is as deeply ingrained as heterosexuality.... There is no reason to think it
would be any easier for homosexual[s] ... to reverse their sexual orientation than it would be for
hetereosexual[s] ... to become predominantly or exclusively homosexual." See Gay Rights Coali-
tion v. Georgetown U., 536 A.2d 1, 34-35 (D.C. App. 1987) (quoting Alan P. Bell, Martin S. Wein-
berg, and Sue Kiefer Hammersmith, Sexual Preference-Its Development in Men and Women
190, 222 (Indiana U., 1981)).
201. Steffan, 780 F. Supp. at 7.
202. Jantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1548. See also High Tech Gays II, 909 F.2d at 377 (Canby, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court has "more than once recited the characteristics of a
suspect class without mentioning immutability").
203. Jantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1548. The court pointed out that aliens may obtain citizenship,
gender may be surgically changed, and lighter skinned blacks could pass as white. Id. For example,
"[d]iscrimination on the basis of race would not become permissible merely because a future scien-
tific advance permits the change in skin pigmentation." Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. High Tech Gays II sets forth another practical alternative to absolute immutability:
"The real question is whether discrimination on the basis of the class's distinguishing characteris-
tic amounts to an unfair branding or resort to prejudice." High Tech Gays II, 909 F.2d at 377
(Canby, J., dissenting).
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definition of immutability, therefore, discrimination against sexual ori-
entation significantly violates an individual's character.20 6
3. Political Powerlessness
Fortunately for the homosexual community, several states and cit-
ies have enacted laws forbidding discrimination based upon sexual ori-
entation in various contexts, including employment.20 7 Unfortunately,
some courts choose to view these relatively minor advances in gay civil
rights as evidence that homosexuals wield political power.2 08 Further-
more, the Steffan court cites recent AIDS legislation as proof that
homosexuals exercise political power in the issues that affect them.2 °9
The courts would have to disqualify every group from attaining (or
maintaining) suspect or quasi-suspect status, however, if they deter-
mine the amount of political power by the passage of relevant legisla-
tion.210 Although such legislation certainly is a step in the right
direction, it cannot compare to the volumes of law dedicated to elimi-
nating discrimination based on race or gender. 1' Conversely, the failure
of countless proposals to add sexual orientation to Title VII's list of
protected characteristics represents the most obvious indication that
the homosexual community wields little political clout.
4. Sexual Conduct Versus Sexual Orientation
Many courts have refused to grant homosexuals suspect status be-
cause the Supreme Court has upheld statutes that criminalize homosex-
206. Jantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1548. See also Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orien-
tation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1285, 1303 (1985).
207. Eight states currently prohibit such discrimination: Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann.
§§ 111.31 et seq. (West, 1988)); Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 46a-81a et seq. (West,
1993)); New Jersey (N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-10:12 (West, 1993)); Vermont (1992 Vt. Laws 135);
California (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1102.1 et seq. (West, 1982 & Supp. 1983)); Minnesota (Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 609.2231 (West, 1993)); Massachussetts (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 4 (West,
1993)); Hawaii (Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 378-2 (1992)). Major American cities with anti-discrimination
laws include New York, Los Angeles, Washington, San Francisco, Boston, Atlanta, Detroit, Phila-
delphia, Houston, Denver, and Baltimore. See Paul W. Valentine, Baltimore Outlaws Homosexu-
ality Discrimination, Wash. Post A2 (May 24, 1988).
208. See High Tech Gays I, 895 F.2d at 574; Steffan, 780 F. Supp. at 7-9.
209. Steffan, 780 F. Supp. at 9. The court opined that homosexuals exercise political power
"not only with respect to themselves, but also with respect to issues of the day that affect them."
Id. at 7-8.
210. See High Tech Gays II, 909 F. 2d. at 377-78 (Canby, J., dissenting). The court com-
pared the legislative successes of the homosexual community with those of the black community,
which already constitutes a suspect class. Id. Blacks are protected by three federal constitutional
amendments, several federal civil rights acts, and anti-discrimination laws in 48 states. Id. By
comparison, "and by absolute standards as well," homosexuals as a class are politically powerless.
Id.
211. Jantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1550.
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ual sodomy.212 Describing judicially sanctioned criminalization of "the
behavior that defines the class" as state-sponsored discrimination, the
Padula v. Webster court declined to conclude that any state discrimina-
tion against the class deserves heightened scrutiny.213 In the context of
equal protection, however, a court should be concerned with the status
of the class, not its activities.2 14 Sexual orientation itself has not been
criminalized.213 Moreover, Bowers v. Hardwick"6 allows homosexual
sodomy to be criminalized but does not address the full range of homo-
sexual conduct. Because homosexuality is a status, an individual would
be engaging in homosexual conduct "while playing bridge just as much
as while engaging in sexual activity.
'21 7
The foregoing analysis reveals that sexual orientation clearly satis-
fies the criteria that define suspect classifications. Homosexuals histori-
cally and currently suffer from widespread, pernicious discrimination
based on ignorance and fear.21 s Scientific research strongly indicates
that individuals do not choose to be homosexual; rather, genetics, hor-
mones, and environment combine to determine sexual orientation at an
early age.219 Sexual orientation is immutable because it plays a tremen-
dous part in defining an individual's personhood.220 As a minority class,
homosexuals wield very little political power.221 Finally, sexual orienta-
tion connotes a status that should not be defined solely by the sexual
conduct that may accompany it. 222 As a suspect classification, sexual
orientation deserves the heightened protection presently afforded race,
sex, religion, and national origin.
212. See, for example, High Tech Gays I, 895 F.2d at 571; Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97,
103 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding homosexual sod-
omy criminally actionable despite the Due Process Clause).
213. Padula, 822 F.2d at 103. The Padula court declared that "there can hardly be more
palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal."
Id.
214. High Tech Gays II, 909 F.2d at 380 (Canby, J., dissenting). See also Cass R. Sunstein,
Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and
Equal Protection, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161, 1165-70 (1988). Professor Sunstein states that the
criminalization of homosexual conduct is irrelevant when considering an equal protection chal-
lenge. Id. at 1167.
215. Watkins 1, 847 F.2d at 1346.
216. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
217. High Tech Gays II, 909 F.2d at 380 (Canby, J., dissenting).
218. See notes 168-88 and accompanying text.
219. See notes 191-201 and accompanying text.
220. See notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
221. See notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
222. See notes 212-217 and accompanying text.
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IV. ENLARGING THE BULL'S-EYE: ONE STEP CLOSER TO THE IDEAL
AMERICAN WORKPLACE
The Equal Protection Clause and Title VII ultimately seek to pro-
tect historically disadvantaged minority groups from discrimination
based upon traits that reveal nothing about an individual's capacity to
perform a job or to contribute to society. Not coincidentally, both pro-
scribe discrimination based upon race, sex, national origin, and religion,
none of which bear any relation to an individual's worth as a productive
employee or citizen. This Note argues that sexual orientation contains
all of the elements that the courts require of a suspect class; thus, it
should stand on equal footing with the other classes protected by the
Equal Protection Clause and Title VII. By analogy, therefore, Title VII
should protect individuals from employer discrimination based solely
upon their sexual orientation.
Analogy alone will not compel the courts' decisions, however, espe-
cially in the face of overwhelmingly adverse precedent. Although the
current social and political climate supports bold judicial action,22 3 the
majority of the courts' forays into the sexual orientation issue, as it re-
lates to both equal protection and Title VII, represent prime examples
of judicial restraint.224 For example, having discerned Congress's narrow
view of sex under Title VII from the dearth of legislative history and
the subsequent failure of several sexual orientation amendments, the
Ulane court declined to "judicially expand the definition of sex as used
in Title VII beyond its common and traditional interpretation. '225 Al-
though the court admitted its obligation to construe remedial statutes
223. Professor William Eskridge argues that courts should interpret remedial statutes such
as Title VII dynamically, "in light of their present societal, political and legal context." William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1479 (1987). Society's
growing awareness of and concern about sexual orientation issues stems from increased activism
and efforts by states, municipalities, and private corporations to afford homosexuals equal rights in
employment, housing, and other areas, as well as from the devastating effects of AIDS on the
homosexual community. Judge Patricia Wald of the District of Columbia Circuit accordingly ob-
served: "Our changing social and political climate may at last be consigning overt, obvious discrim-
ination against gays and lesbians to the historical dust bin of Jim Crow laws." United States Info.
Agency v. Krc, 989 F.2d 1211, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Wald, J., dissenting in part).
224. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, recently dared to apply an "active" ra-
tional basis review to the military's ban on homosexual members. Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160
(9th Cir. 1991). The Pruitt court warned that government policies that merely give effect to social
prejudices regarding sexual orientation cannot meet the rational basis standard. The court de-
clared that "[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect." Id. at 1165 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
225. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086. For a discussion of Ulane, see notes 80-102 and accompanying
text.
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such as Title VII liberally, it hesitated to overstep its interpretive
bounds and infringe on Congress's legislative prerogatives.22
Several courts have relied on the Ulane rationale to refuse homo-
sexual employees protection under Title VII.2 2 7 Although this conserva-
tism from the federal courts is not surprising, in light of Title VII's
broad remedial goal and the current discrimination faced by homosexu-
als in the workplace, the courts' cautious approach seems almost negli-
gent. Despite the courts' acknowledgment that Title VII mandates a
broad interpretation to satisfy its remedial purpose of eliminating em-
228 1iployment discrimination, such an interpretation has failed to
materialize.
The courts also have recognized that Congress deliberately struc-
tured Title VII loosely to allow for the statute's application to future
modes of employment discrimination. 229 This open framework invites
the evolution of Title VII protection through judicial interpretation,
rather than through legislative amendments. Moreover, the homosexual
community has failed to achieve protection from discrimination
through amendments because Congress, as a whole, is unsympathetic to
the needs of such politically powerless minorities. 230 The democratic
226. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086.
227. See, for example, Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978)
(quoting Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975)) (holding
that "the prohibition on sexual discrimination could not be 'extend[ed] ... to situations of ques-
tionable application without some stronger Congressional mandate' "). The court in Dillon v.
Frank also felt "constrained to bold that [Dillon] has not stated a cause of action under Title VII,"
but admitted that it "sympathize[d] with [Dillon's] plight." Dillon, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766 at
*2.
228. Title VII "requires an interpretation animated by the broad humanitarian and remedial
purposes underlying the federal proscription of employment discrimination." Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
229. In Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
explained that: "Congress chose neither to enumerate specific discriminatory practices, nor to elu-
cidate in extenso the parameter of such nefarious activities. Rather, it pursued the path of wisdom
by being unconstrictive, knowing that constant change is the order of our day and that the seem-
ingly reasonable practices of the present can easily become the injustices of the morrow." Id. at
238.
Title VII's open construction may not reflect so noble an inspiration, however. According to
Professor Randy Barnett, some statutes "are deliberately rendered vague to enable politicians to
support particular legislation that pleases certain constituencies without alienating others." Randy
E. Barnett, Foreward: Judicial Conservatism v. A Principled Judicial Activism, 10 Harv. J. L. &
Pub. Pol. 273, 288 (1987).
230. Powerless, stigmatized minorities, such as homosexuals, are "perpetual losers" in the
political arena. Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities,
91 Yale L. J. 1287, 1296 (1982). The discrete and insular nature of these minorities prevents their
participation in the political process, while popular prejudice interferes with the legislature's abil-
ity to protect them. Id. See also Milner S. Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless Minorities, 59
Iowa L. Rev. 1059, 1063 (1974) (explaining that regardless of minority participation in the political
process, prejudice remains a critical factor in preventing lawmakers from protecting disfavored
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system consistently has failed members of the homosexual community,
yet the courts, just as consistently, have declined to remedy this
injustice.2 3'
The courts seem to fear that by "rush[ing] in to remedy ... the
failings of the political processes, [they] deprive[ ] those processes of an
opportunity to function." '232 The courts' inaction, therefore, effectively
places the ball in Congress's court. Accordingly, Congress itself must
amend Title VII to proscribe employment discrimination based upon
sexual orientation, thus fulfilling the statute's broad remedial goals.
Admittedly, proposals to add sexual orientation to Title VII's list
of protected characteristics have failed many times. Legislators have
hesitated to expand Title VII to include what they perceive to be a
lifestyle choice or a matter of personal conviction. For example, Senator
John Glenn supported his opposition to one amendment by explaining
that "Title VII now covers matters of race, creed, sex, color and na-
tional origin .... These are all matters of religious or genetic attributes.
I do not believe it is advisable to broaden and extend Title VII into
areas of personal behavior. "233
This Note argues that sexual orientation may have a biological ori-
gin and, at any rate, is not merely a "lifestyle choice" any more than
religion is.2 34 Sexual orientation simply plays no role in qualifying an
individual for a particular job. 3 5 Other bodies of government have rec-
ognized and acted successfully upon this fact by offering homosexuals
minorities); Senate Bill Would Ban Job Discrimination Against Gays, 27 Daily Labor Rep. (BNA)
A2 (Feb. 8, 1983) (quoting Senator Paul Tsongas as stating that protection of homosexuals is "a
very explosive and sensitive political issue" for which it is difficult to muster support among mem-
bers of Congress).
231. See generally Plyler. v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In Plyler, the Supreme Court struck
down on equal protection grounds a state statute denying funds to schools that enrolled undocu-
mented alien children. Id. Chief Justice Burger dissented from the activist opinion, claiming that:
"[T]he Constitution does not constitute us as "Platonic Guardians" nor does it vest in this Court
the authority to strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable social pol-
icy, "wisdom," or "common sense"... [I]t is not the function of the Judiciary to provide "effective
leadership" simply because the political branches of government fail to do so." Id. at 242-43 (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 253.
233. Dan Balz, Glenn Seeks to Reassure N.Y. Backer; Stance Against Rights Bill for Homo-
sexuals at Issue, Wash. Post A2 (Nov. 16, 1983).
234. See notes 191-206 and accompanying text.
235. Compare Michael J. Perry, Equal Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual
Agenda of Constitutional Theory: Reflections On, and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
329, 332 (1983) (stating that "no person should be deemed, by virtue of an irrelevant factor, less
deserving of respect, concern, and opportunity for self-fulfillment, or more deserving of subordina-
tion to or domination by others").
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protection from discrimination.2 3 6 Congress should, and indeed must,
follow suit in order to fulfill the goals of Title VII.
V. CONCLUSION
Revisit the original scenario. Should Congress choose to amend Ti-
tle VII to prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion, Jerry certainly would prevail on his discrimination claim. By
amending Title VII to proscribe discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion, Congress would strengthen its longstanding commitment to "bring
an end to job discrimination once and for all, and to insure every citizen
the opportunity for the decent self-respect that accompanies a job com-
mensurate with one's abilities. '23 7 By the partners' own admission,
Jerry excelled in his position. His sexual orientation neither detracted
from nor enhanced his investment banking talents. Jerry's homosexual-
ity had absolutely no effect on his job performance and thus could not
possibly provide a legitimate reason for refusing to promote him. By
enlarging Title VII's target to include invidious discrimination based on
sexual orientation, Congress not only would vindicate the rights of
homosexuals to enjoy the same employment opportunities currently af-
forded other qualified individuals but also would bring society one step
closer to the ideal, nondiscriminatory workplace Congress envisioned
when it enacted Title VII.
Marie Elena Peluso
236. For example, the state of Wisconsin has protected homosexuals from discrimination for
more than a decade without "elevat[ing] homosexuals to a special status, [or] ... burden[ing] the
system." J. Jennings Moss, Wisconsin Set State Precedent on Gay Rights, Wash. Times A7 (Apr.
25, 1993). The federal Department of Transportation recently celebrated a "gay pride" month and
has enacted a policy prohibiting discrimination against workers on the basis of their sexual orien-
tation. Joyce Price, DOT to Celebrate Gay Pride Month; Aim Is "Diversity, Not Special Rights,"
Wash. Times Al (June 11, 1993). Homosexual federal civil service employees have enjoyed a modi-
cum of protection since 1969, when the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that
due process required the government to demonstrate a "specific connection" between an em-
ployee's sexual conduct and the "efficiency of the service." Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1167
(D.C. Cir. 1969). The Federal Personnel Manual accordingly provides that homosexuality per se is
not grounds for rejection or discharge from federal service except when the "sexual conduct affects
job fitness." Determining Suitability for Federal Employment, Fed. Personnel Man. 8 (Supp. 631-
1, 1975).
237. Cotton, 80 Nw. L. Rev. at 1052 (cited in note 83) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1971)).
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